To what extent do people adapt their information search policies and subsequent decisions to the longand short-run consequences of choice environments? To address this question, we investigated exploration and exploitation policies in choice environments that involved single or multiple plays. We further compared behavior in these environments with behavior in the standard sampling paradigm. Frequently used in research on decision from experience, this paradigm does not explicitly implement the choice in terms of the short or long run. Results showed that people searched more in the multi-play environment than in the single-play environment. Moreover, the substantial search effort in the multi-play environment was conducive to choices consistent with expected value maximization, whereas the lesser search effort in the single-play environment was compatible with the goal of maximizing the chance of winning something. Furthermore, choice and search behaviors in the sampling paradigm predominantly echoed those observed in the single-play environment. This suggests that, when not instructed otherwise, participants in the sampling paradigm appear to favor search and choice strategies that embody short-run aspirations. Finally, the present findings challenge the revealed preference approach in decisions from experience, while also suggesting that information search may be an important and potentially even better signal of preference or aspirations than choice.
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Introduction
Choices between uncertain options can be interpreted as representing either single-play or multi-play decisions. A lottery ticket, for instance, represents a single-play decision; its entry price entitles the player to exactly one play of the lottery. A choice to buy car insurance, on the other hand, guarantees against repeated plays of a gamble that is realized each time the car is driven. More generally, decisions to buy products that will be consumed either once (e.g., a dinner in a gourmet restaurant) or many times (e.g., a pair of running shoes) involve different time horizons. These may, in turn, prompt differences in the decisions made as well as in the information needed to render a decision. For illustration, consider the offer that Nobel-prize winning economist Paul Samuelson (1963) once made his lunch partners: ''to bet each $200 to $100 that the side of the coin they specified would not appear at the first toss'' (p. 50). One colleague, whom Samuelson identified as a distinguished scholar but otherwise granted anonymity, responded to the offer by saying: ''I won't bet because I would feel the $100 loss more than the $200 gain. But I'll take you on if you promise to let me make 100 such bets'' (p. 2). Samuelson (1963) considered his colleague's preference to be inconsistent with expected utility theory and, by extension, to be irrational (a fallacy of large numbers): ''. . . no sequence is acceptable if each of its single plays is not acceptable'' (p. 3).
More recent analyses, however, have concluded that models of expected utility theory-by many considered the normative theory of individual decision making-can in fact capture the colleague's preference for safety in numbers, assuming that the 100 bets are aggregated to a single choice. Ex ante aggregation brings the final distribution of potential payoffs of a gamble much closer to its expected value and accordingly reduces in the above example the likelihood of a loss (Aloysius, 2007; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; Wedell, 2011; see also Peköz, 2002 
